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This dissertation includes three essays in applied microeconomics, which is a fundamental 
outward-looking branch of economics that applies both economics theories and methodologies to 
actual questions of individual behavior and societal outcomes. The three essays are focusing on 
real world topics of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion, female economists’ collaboration networks 
and occupations licensing. In the first essay, using the restricted NHANES data from 2007 to 2014, 
effects of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion on three public health measures are examined by 
comparing expansion states with non-expansion states. The results show that the Medicaid 
expansion in 2014 decreases the systolic blood pressure and increases the usage of cholesterol 
lowering medication, however, no significant effects on diabetes measures. It is also confirmed 
that the ACA’s Medicaid expansion increases the total health and Medicaid coverage. In the 
second essay, a unique randomized control trial of CEMENT workshop is examined to investigate 
its effect on female economists’ collaboration networks. The CEMENT workshop provides a 
particular opportunity to observe female economists’ career accomplishments and research 
productivity in the program. The results show that the participating female economics scholars 
publish about one more paper and have about 0.5 more numbers of unique coauthors on average, 
comparing to the control group. The CEMENT workshop helps the treated female economists 
improve their research productivity and expand the magnitude of their collaboration networks. The 
last essay studies the effects of occupational licensing on non-U.S. citizen’s labor market 
outcomes, using the monthly CPS Job Certification data from 2015 to 2019. Non-U.S. citizens are 
found to be less likely to have job certificates or licenses. Compared to licensed U.S. natives, non-
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This dissertation is the collection of three papers in applied microeconomics.  
The first chapter is on the ACA’s Medicaid expansion in 2014. The objective of this chapter 
is to examine the effects of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion in 2014 on health outcome with a 
difference-in-differences approach, using restricted geotagged NHANES data from 2007 to 2014. 
Consistent with previous studies, we find that the ACA’s Medicaid expansion increased the 
Medicaid coverage in 2014 in expanded states. We also find that the ACA’s Medicaid expansion 
in 2014 is associated with a decrease in systolic blood pressure of 4.125 mmHg (3.4%) and an 
increase in the usage of cholesterol lowering medication of 5.2 percentage points. In constrast, no 
significant effects of diabetes measures or medications are found. With the still hot going questions 
and arguments of the trend of government’s attitudes, as well as the public’s attention, this study 
results shed light on how ACA’s Medicaid expansion improve health.  
The second chapter is a unique study of female economists’ collaboration networks, using 
the CEMENT data. Women has long been underrepresented in academic ranks in the economics 
profession. Female economics scholars are not only less likely to get promoted in the academia 
but also have lower research productivity. Many researchers argue that a lack of professional 
networks among female economists contributes to this underrepresentation. The Committee on the 
Status of Women in the Economics Profession (CSWEP) of the American Economics Association 
(AEA) established the CEMENT mentoring workshop to support women in research careers. 
CEMENT is a randomized control trial that contributes to an exogenous change in professional 
networks. As collaboration is measured by coauthorship networks in academic research area, 
CEMENT provides a unique data set to monitor female economists in treated groups to examine 





women. Our results show that treated women publish about one more paper. However, once we 
control for coauthors, the treatment effect is no longer significant, indicating that the collaboration 
networks help with research productivity. We further find that the CEMENT program increases 
the number of coauthors for the treated female economics scholars.  
The third chapter investigates the effect of occupational licensing on labor market 
outcomes, using the new CPS Job Certification data. Researchers have examined the wage 
premium of working with an occupational license, yet fewer studies have looked into the 
occupational licensing effect in the groups of non-U.S. citizens. In this chapter, I re-examine the 
wage premium of occupational licensing, and extend it to the labor market effects of occupational 
licensing of non-U.S. citizens, using the monthly personal data from the IPUMS-CPS with the 
newly added data on job certifications and licensing from October 2017 to January 2019. 
Preliminary results show that non-U.S. citizens experiences a wage penalty and are less likely to 
obtain job certifications and licenses. Furthermore, even with a license, non-U.S. citizens are still 
earning less, compared to U.S. natives. 
 The three essays in this dissertation contribute to the ongoing literature in applied 
microeconomics. The first chapter contributes to the understanding of the Medicaid expansion and 
enriches the literature on the improvement of health in both policy studies and health affairs. The 
second chapter is a unique study of the collaboration networks of female economists, using the 
unique randomized control trial of CEMENT workshop to deal with the endogeneity of networks. 
The third chapter contributes to the research studies of the effect of occupational licensing on 








DOES THE ACA’S MEDICAID EXPANSION IMPROVE HEALTH? 
 
I. Introduction 
While Medicaid before 2014 provided health coverage to millions of Americans, many 
low-income adults were ineligible. These individuals could not afford to manage chronic 
conditions due to a lack of health insurance and the resulting unaffordable out-of-pocket medical 
costs, effectively reducing access to health care services. The Affordable Care Act was intended 
to close this coverage gap by expanding Medicaid to adults with income of or below 138% of the 
federal poverty level, making most low-income adults largely eligible. 
While the Affordable Care Act was targeted at giving more Americans access to affordable 
and quality health insurance, it also aimed at reducing the growth of the health care costs. Early 
studies have already established that the Medicaid reimbursements was positively correlated with 
the physician treatment of Medicaid patients (Showalter 1997). Under the ACA, expansion states 
would receive more assistance on Medicaid program, which would have a positive impact on 
prenatal care (Mukerjee and Quinn 2008) and substantial long-term benefits (Miller and Wherry 
2016). 
Prior to 2014 ACA’s Medicaid expansion, several papers studied the effects of earlier 
expansions. The 2008 Oregon expansion of traditional Medicaid showed that Medicaid eligibility 
leaded to greater health care utilization, lower out-of-pocket medical expenditures, fewer medical 
bills, and better self-reported health (Finkelstein et al. 2012); yet it seemed to have no statistically 
significant effect on hypertension, high cholesterol levels, or high hemoglobin levels (Baicker et 





coverage under Medicaid in their early life (Miller and Wherry 2016).  Finally, the prior Medicaid 
expansions also reduced the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) participation (Burns and Dague 
2016), as previously one needed to get onto SSI to get Medicaid. 
Despite the intention of the Affordable Care Act, the Supreme Court in 2012 permitted 
individual states to choose not to expand Medicaid and to decline substantial federal funding.  This 
partial expansion1 has generated an abundance of research to evaluate the impacts of the Medicaid 
expansion on numerous aspects. Relative to non-expansion states, expansion states had increases 
in health insurance coverage for low-income adults (Black and Cohen 2015; Blumberg et al. 2016) 
and decreases in the uninsured rate (Benitez et al. 2016; Sommers et al. 2016). However, multiple 
other papers found minimal effects on labor supply, measured by employment status, labor force 
participation, or hours worked (Kaestner et al. 2015; Hamersma and Unel 2015; Leung and Mas 
2016; Bradley et al. 2016; Gooptu et al. 2016). There was at least some evidence, though, for a 
reduction in hours worked for people who working with lower educational attainment (Asako et 
al. 2016), and a trade-off between full-time and part-time (Aslim 2016).  Finally, consistent with 
the work from the Oregon expansion (Finkelstein et al. 2012), the ACA Medicaid expansion also 
improved multiple economic outcomes. This included significant reductions in the number of 
unpaid bills and the amount of debt (Hu et al. 2016), an increase of personal credit score and a 
decrease in the probability of bankruptcy (Caswell 2016), and a reduction in federal disability 
program participation (Chatterji and Li 2016).  
On the hospital side, the Medicaid expansion has caused a significant increase in Medicaid 
admissions, as well as a significant decrease in admissions covered by other commercial insurance. 
                                                 
1 27 states expanded Medicaid in 2014, including the District of Columbia. Five more states expanded Medicaid 





(Hempstead and Cantor 2016). Uncompensated care costs have also decreased (Blavin and 
Holahan 2016), while Medicaid discharges and hospital revenues have been increased (Nikpay 
2016). At the individual level, many papers pointed to improvements of access to health care, such 
as physician visit, certain dental visit, overnight hospital stays, and breast exam (Wherry and Miller 
2016; Simon et al. 2016; Sommers et al. 2016), and utilization of health services (Decker 2016). 
However, a few papers did not find significant effects on health care access and utilization 
(Shartzer et al. 2015; Sommers et al. 2016). To our knowledge, however, only one paper has 
examined health outcomes of Medicaid expansion and found an increase in diagnoses of diabetes 
by 5.2 percentage points and diagnoses of high cholesterol by 5.7 percentage points (Wherry and 
Miller 2016). 
The primary reason for this lack of research on the effect of Medicaid expansion on health 
outcomes is data limitations.  Our paper is the first2 to use professionally gathered actual health 
data to study the impact of the Medicaid expansion in 2014.  The National Health and Nutrition 
Examination Survey (NHANES) microdata contains the results of a health examination, as well as 
interviews and questionnaires. While this data has not previously been used to study the ACA 
Medicaid Expansion, one paper has used this data cross-sectionally to examine the correlation 
between health insurance and the health outcomes using NHANES 1999-2012, showing that health 
insurance coverage was associated with significant lower Hemoglobin A1c, total cholesterol and 
systolic blood pressure (Hogan et al. 2015). 
In our paper, we seek to be the first to examine the impacts of the ACA Medicaid expansion 
in 2014 on direct health measures, including both the objective measures and the self-reported 
                                                 






diagnoses of diabetes, high blood pressure, and high cholesterol, using the NHANES data. We 
exploit the effects of the state-variation resulting from the partial Medicaid expansion, using a 
difference-in-differences model. With the consistent finding of Medicaid expansion increasing 
health insurance coverage, we expect to see improvements in health outcomes in expansion states 
in three aspects: (1) reductions in the diagnosis of high blood pressure, high cholesterol and 
diabetes; (2) an increasing in prescript medication for hypertension, hypercholesterolemia and 
diabetes; and (3) improvements in examination results of blood pressure, cholesterol level and 
Hemoglobin A1c. Therefore, our paper would improve our understanding of how public policy 
decisions regarding health coverage impact health outcomes.   
II. Data 
As mentioned above, the primary data used in this analysis come from a public and 
restricted data of the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES) for the years 
1999-2014. The NHANES data is designed to directly and objectively assess the health and 
nutrition conditions of American adults and children. This survey is a unique data set with both 
interviews and physical examinations, which provides both professional and self-reported 
diagnostic health information of individuals in our analysis, as well as demographic and 
geographic information.  
As described above, the NHANES collects information on both objective and self-reported 
health outcomes. Objective health outcomes come from the NHANES examination and laboratory 
tests, while self-reported health information is from individual interview and questionnaire. In our 
analysis, we focus on three objective health outcomes: total cholesterol, systolic blood pressure, 
and hemoglobin A1c, as per Hogan et al. (2015)’s work with the NHANES on the correlation 





while fasting (Sidhu et al. 2012), allowing us to use the larger examination subsample as opposed 
to the smaller fasting subsample. 
In addition to these examination variables, there are also variables for self-reported 
information from the interviews.  This includes three related variables for each condition.  One is 
whether a physician has diagnosed the individual with the condition associated with that variable 
(i.e., hypercholesterolemia, hypertension, and diabetes, respectively).  Another is whether a 
physician has ever told the individual to take medication for that condition.  Finally, the third is 
whether the individual is currently taking the prescribed medicine for that condition.  To be noted 
that the survey questions change as of the diagnosis of diabetes that there are two diagnosis 
variables for diabetes (diabetes and borderline diabetes). Only one question asked for the 
prescribed medication for diabetes. Additionally, the data set also contains variables on a variety 
of demographic information on each individual, as well information on health insurance. 
We supplement the NHANES data with public data from BLS’s Local Area 
Unemployment Statistics). This allows us to control for the seasonally unadjusted unemployment 
rate at the county-month level, as unemployment affects both Medicaid eligibility (through 
income) and health outcomes (e.g., Ruhm 2000; Cutler et al. 2016). 
Finally, the restricted version of the NHANES that we used for this project contains several 
non-public variables, including the dates of the examination and interview, the state and county of 
residence of the respondent, and the annual survey weight (as opposed to the public biennial ones).  
This allows us to match each observation to whether he or she lived in a treated or control state 








Our primary source of variation in this paper is whether a surveyed individual living in a 
state that was substantially affected by the ACA’s Medicaid expansion. We use a difference-in-
difference (DID) research design, comparing changes in outcomes in the group of treated states to 
the same changes in the control states. Following the classification strategy by Kaestner et al. 
(2015), we group all 51 states (and DC) by both their expansion status in 2014 and the 
implementation of expansions similar to the ACA prior to 2014, as these prior expansions would 
reduce the impact of the ACA. Such classification is more reasonable since early expansion 
experience would influence the differences in the impacts of ACA before and after the expansion. 
The treated states fall into one of two categories:   
• Treated states that expanded Medicaid in 2014 and had a partial or limited prior 
expansion similar to the ACA: AZ, CA, CO, CT, HI, IA, IL, MD, MN, NJ, OR RI, and 
WA. 
• Treated states that expanded Medicaid in 2014 and had no prior expansion similar 
to ACA: AR, KY, MI, NH, NV, NM, ND, OH, and WV.3 
            Noted that we include both MI and NH in the treated group, although both states did not 
expand Medicaid from January of 2014. Michigan expanded Medicaid in April of 2014, which is 
an early month that the Medicaid expanded for 9 months of the year. While New Hampshire 
expanded Medicaid in August of 2014, it is a small state with smaller population than other states 
                                                 
3 Note that Michigan expanded Medicaid in April of 2014 and New Hampshire expanded in August of 2014. Following 
Kasetner et al. (2015), we consider both of them to be treated, as Michigan was an expansion state for most of the year 






so that the later year expansion is not likely to affect our analysis results. Besides, we have month 
information from the NHANES data that we can get control of the expansion month. 
      The control group includes two other groups of states.  First, obviously, it includes all non-
expansion states in 2014.4  Secondly, it also includes states had partial expansions prior to 2014. 
There are other five Medicaid expansion states (DE, DC, MA, NY, and VT) that are excluded from 
our analysis. Because these states had full/comprehensive prior expanding experience similar to 
ACA of 2014, we expect to see little to no change in these states after 2014.  The control states are 
therefore fall into one of the following two categories:  
• Non-Medicaid expansion states that had no prior expanding experience: AL, AK, 
FL, GA, ID, KS, LA, MS, MO, MT, NE, NC, OK, PA, SC, SD, TX, UT, VA, and WY. 
• Non-Medicaid expansion states that had limited/partial prior expanding experience: 
IN, ME, TN, and WI.  
            We limit the sample to non-disabled adult age 19 to 64 with high school education or less 
who live in above treated and control states. This is preferable to define the sample by income, yet 
the Medicaid expansion is targeted at people with income of or less than 138% of Federal Poverty 
Level (FPL) and so income is endogenous.5 Educational attainment, on the other hand, is strongly 
correlated with income but not directly related to Medicaid eligibility and so provides a reasonable 
“intent to treat” subsample. Such sample stratification is used in Kaestner et al. (2015). In addition 
to this sample, we also include a separate sample with college graduates as a comparison placebo 
group. Furthermore, we constrain our data to those with non-missing values for the key outcome 
                                                 
4 In addition, several states, including Indiana, Pennsylvania, Alaska, Montana and Louisiana, expanded Medicaid 
after 2014.  As 2015 is beyond the scope of this paper, we have considered those states non expansion states here. 
5 Using income to constrain the sample not only results in endogeneity but also limits the sample size to be even 





variables: systolic blood pressure, total cholesterol, medication for high cholesterol and diabetes. 
This allow us to have a more consistent sample size through all variables of interests in the analysis.   
With the above classification, we estimate the effect of ACA Medicaid expansion on health 
outcomes using the following regression models. In the following equations, i is for an individual 
in the survey, c for the county that individual lives in, s for the state that individual lives in, and t 










y are the outcomes of interest, including, cholesterol, blood pressure, and diabetes. X is a vector 
individual level demographic controls, including age, gender, racial dummy indicators, family 
income poverty ratio, marital status, family size, household size, citizenship status, and pregnancy 
status. It also includes the county-time-level unemployment rate control.  time is a vector of year 
and month fixed effects (to control for national level differences by year and also for seasonality), 
and geography a vector of state fixed effects (to control for time invariant level differences by 
geography).  σ is the primary coefficient of interest. 
Implemented will equal one if the year (of interview or examination, depending on the 
outcome) is 2014 and zero otherwise.  The sample will be limited to those age 19-64 (to avoid 
confounding the results with programs for children or the elderly), and educational attainment of 
a high school diploma or less (per Kaestner et al. 2015 and Hu et al. 2016). The years 2007-2013 
will be used as control years to be compared to 2014.  The regression is weighted using the   








A. Summary Statistics 
Descriptive statistics are presented in Tables 1. There are 5024 observations in the years 
2007-2014 which have restricted state and county identifier, among which only 200 observations 
are in treated states in 2014. This unfortunately feature of the data results in two large 
consequences for our analysis: first, since many of our variables of interest have missing values 
for some observations, we are limited in what we can investigate.  Second, our results will be noisy 
and so while we believe we have come to plausible conclusions, they are less robust than we would 
like. 
Table 2 shows the means of the primary variables from NHANES that we use for each of 
the four groups of observations in Table 1.  From the summary statistics, we can conclude two 
facts.  First, there are some substantial 2014 differences between the treatment and control states.  
This is not surprising as the decision to expand Medicaid was not random and rather was the result 
of a partisan political process.  These differences necessitate the individual demographic controls 
that are included in the regressions below. Second, as mentioned above, with the concern of non-
blank values, we keep our sample to be close to non-missing sample. Even within our constrained 
sample, we still encountered missing values of control variables. To address it, we coded up 
variables with missing values accordingly to try to get a relatively bigger sample size. The 
Medicaid variable’s high missing value rate is particularly unfortunate, resulting in a still-small 
sample size (especially the treated sample), as it makes it impossible to either have Medicaid as an 
outcome variable or do a two-stage analysis.  The regression below are therefore reduced form 






B. Sensitivity Analysis 
            Before the Difference-in-Differences analysis, we include a sensitivity analysis. First, we 
present an event study of differences in trends on key insurance variables (Figure 1-1 and Figure 
1-2) and objective health measures of our main sample (Figure 2-1, 2-2, and 2-3). Second, we 
conduct pre-trend analysis on the same insurance variables and objective health measures. Results 
are shown in Table 3. Although the pre-trend coefficient on Hemoglobin A1c is significant at 10% 
level, all insignificant pre-trend coefficients prove the pre-trend common assumption for our 
Difference-in-Difference method that no effect happened before 2014.  
C. Difference-in-Differences Analysis 
Main regression results are shown in Table 4 to 6, one for each medical condition of high 
cholesterol, high blood pressure, and diabetes. Each contains the results of separate regression on 
two different samples. The “HS Sample” is our main regression sample, and the “COL Sample” is 
our placebo sample with college education. All regressions are controlled for state fixed effect, 
and time (year and month) fixed effects.  
Table 4 shows the results for cholesterol measures. The four coefficients take a consistent 
story, although only one is statistically significant. 5.2 percentage points more people were told to 
take cholesterol lowering medicine, and potentially more people were diagnosed with high 
cholesterol. Negative coefficient on objective measure of total cholesterol, indicating a possible 
outcome of the increasing medication to lower cholesterol level. Thus, Medicaid expansion in 
2014 is found to be associated in the increase in cholesterol lowering medication.  
Table 5 shows the analogous results for blood pressure measures. Medicaid expansion in 
2014 is found to be associated with a reduction of 4.125 mmHg in systolic blood pressure, which 





result of changes in the medication to treat hypertension, as we found statistically insignificant 
results for the diagnosis and medication for hypertension.  
Table 6 gives the regression result for Hemoglobin A1c, diagnosis and medication for 
diabetes. Noted that there is a change to the diagnosis variables that there are two of them. One is 
the diagnosis of diabetes, and another is the diagnosis of borderline diabetes. In both conditions, 
prescribed medication could be given as treatment (which likely to depend on doctor’s 
preference and patients’ condition). However, none of the results are more than marginally 
statistically significant.              
In addition, low income sample, as in previous studies, are used as an alternate 
specification. We did the same regression on low income sample and results are presented in 
Appendix Table 1. We have quite consistent point estimates but lose some power and as a result 
statistical significance.  
Analysis on Medicaid coverage is presented in Table 7. Consistent with other studies, we 
found a 3.8 percentage increase in Medicaid coverage for our main sample in expansion states in 
2014. Noted that for low income sample, there is a 5.3 percentage increase in the Medicaid 
coverage in 2014 in treated states, compare to control states. 
V. Discussion 
The results from the tables above are that the Medicaid expansion increased individual’s 
propensity to be cholesterol lowering prescriptions, which had the dual effect of lowering total 
cholesterol and lowering blood pressure.  There was no statistically significant increase in the share 






The cholesterol results are somewhat puzzling given a strong increase in the share of 
individuals taking medicine but a statistically insignificant increase in the share of individuals 
diagnosed with high cholesterol.  However, there is medical literature suggesting that individuals 
are often prescribed cholesterol lowering medication despite having only borderline high 
cholesterol or having other general symptom of metabolic disease (Grundy 2014). And it could be 
possible that people who had been told to take medication only began taking it after they gained 
the Medicaid coverage after the Medicaid expansion in 2014 (or earlier depending on states).  
Additionally, the blood pressure results appear puzzling as there is a drop of blood pressure 
despite no change in medication.  One potential explanation is that a common side effect of 
cholesterol lowering medication is lowered blood pressure (Golomb et al. 2008). Therefore, it is 
plausible that the substantial increase in cholesterol lower prescriptions is also lowering blood 
pressure. 
As mentioned in other studies, dietary and lifestyle can have different effects on health 
improvement. The eating habit and the exercise frequency are two of the factors that can largely 
affect one’s health conditions, which could possibly improve the three health measures we spotted 
in our analysis. However, these factors are not the key concern of our study as we only focused on 
the effect of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion on health outcomes. 
VI. Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine whether the ACA Medicaid expansion in 2014 improve health 
using NHANES data for objectively collected and self-reported health measures, 2007-2014. We 
limit the sample to be non-disabled adults age 19 to 64 with high school education or less, living 
in treated and control states. With the concern endogeneity of income to Medicaid, we use 





the ACA Medicaid expansion is associated with a 5.2 percentage point increase in cholesterol 
lowering medication usage, and a decrease of 4.125 mmHg of systolic blood pressure, likely a side 
effect of the cholesterol lowering medication.  
Overall, this suggests that the Medicaid expansion did result in improved health measures 
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TABLES FOR ESSAY 1 
Table 1: Summary Statistics: Number of Observation with Low Educational Attainment6 
 2007-2013 2014 Total 
Treated states 2137 200 2337 
Control states 2358 329 2687 













                                                 
6 The fact that the interview and examination dates may not be the same for a particular observation can result in the 
two straddling New Year’s Day, such that one but not the other may be before 2007 or after 2014.  This table uses 


























Panel 1: Pre-trend Analysis on Health Insurance Variables 












Panel 2: Pre-trend Analysis on Objective Health Measures 



































Coefficient -4.609 0.042 0.052*** 0.024 
   (3.805) (0.033) (0.016) (0.025) 




Coefficient -1.656 0.048 -0.073 -0.029 
  (4.895) (0.044) (0.043) (0.035) 
     
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Demographic Control Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
 
Notes: HS = High school diploma or less. COL = College Graduate. Robust standard errors clustered at the state level 
are in parentheses. Regressions are weighted using the restricted annual weights for either the interview or exam 
sample. Individual level demographic controls include age, gender, race, family income poverty ratio, marital status, 
family size, household size, citizenship status, and pregnancy status. Year, month, and state fixed effects are included, 















Table 5: Difference-in-Differences Estimates of Effect of ACA Medicaid Expansion on 





















Coefficient -4.125*** -0.006 -0.004 -0.015 
   (1.326) (0.036) (0.022) (0.023) 




Coefficient -1.429 -0.090 -0.024 -0.001 
  (3.023) (0.115) (0.089) (0.098) 
     
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Demographic Control Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Notes: HS = High school diploma or less. COL = College Graduate. Robust standard errors clustered at the state level 
are in parentheses. Regressions are weighted using the restricted annual weights for either the interview or exam 
sample. Individual level demographic controls include age, gender, race, family income poverty ratio, marital status, 
family size, household size, citizenship status, and pregnancy status. Year, month, and state fixed effects are included, 

































Coefficient 0.065 0.008 0.016 0.025 
   (0.088) (0.026) (0.019) (0.016) 




Coefficient 0.110 -0.025 0.023* -0.006 
  (0.098) (0.028) (0.010) (0.033) 
     
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Demographic Control Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Notes: HS = High school diploma or less. COL = College Graduate. Robust standard errors clustered at the state level 
are in parentheses. Regressions are weighted using the restricted annual weights for either the interview or exam 
sample. Individual level demographic controls include age, gender, race, family income poverty ratio, marital status, 
family size, household size, citizenship status, and pregnancy status. Year, month, and state fixed effects are included, 












Table 7: Difference-in-Differences Estimates of Effect of ACA Medicaid Expansion on 






    
HS Sample 
DID Coefficient -0.006 0.038** 
   (0.067) (0.016) 
    
COL 
Sample 
DID Coefficient -0.019 -0.000 
  (0.043) (0.007) 







   
State FE Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes 
Demographic Control Yes Yes 
 
  Notes: HS = High school diploma or less. COL = College Graduate. Robust standard errors clustered at the state 
level are in parentheses. Regressions are weighted using the restricted annual weights for either the interview or exam 
sample. Individual level demographic controls include age, gender, race, family income poverty ratio, marital status, 
family size, household size, citizenship status, and pregnancy status. Year, month, and state fixed effects are included, 














FIGURES FOR ESSAY 1 
 
Figure 1-1: differences in trends on health insurance coverage, 2007-2014 
 
 












Figure 2-1: differences in trends on objective systolic blood pressure (mmHg), 2007-2014 
 
Figure 2-2: differences in trends on objective total cholesterol (mg/dL), 2007-2014 
 









APPENDIX FOR ESSAY 1 
Appendix Table 1: Difference-in-Differences Estimates of Effect of ACA Medicaid 
Expansion on Health Outcomes, Low Income Sample (FPL<= 138%), 2007-2014 
 














DID Coefficient -2.028 0.044 0.081** 0.060 
  (1.277) (0.044) (0.035) (0.043) 














DID Coefficient -1.879 -0.019 -0.003 0.011 
  (3.213) (0.023) (0.035) (0.026) 












DID Coefficient -0.037 0.006 -0.014 0.008 
  (0.098) (0.032) (0.015) (0.021) 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Demographic 
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses. Regressions are weighted using the 
restricted annual weights for either the interview or exam sample. Individual level demographic controls include age, 
gender, race, family income poverty ratio, marital status, family size, household size, citizenship status, and pregnancy 
status. Year, month, and state fixed effects are included, as is the seasonally unadjusted monthly county unemployment 













The data used in this paper comes from three sources: 
 
1. Kaestner et al. (2015)’s classification strategy of states into Medicaid Expansion 
treatment and control groups.  Available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w21836 
 
2. Restricted geocoded NHANES data, accessed at a Census Research Data Center (RDC). 
Proposal information for accessing restricted data is available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/rdc/b3prosal/pp300.htm.  The public data subset is available at 
http://wwwn.cdc.gov/nchs/nhanes/search/nhanes_continuous.aspx 
 






















COLLABORATION NETWORKS AMONG FEMALE ECONOMISTS: AN 
EXAMINATION OF COAUTHORSHIP USING CEMENT DATA 
I. Introduction 
The “leaky pipeline” at virtually every rank of academic economics indicates that women 
are less likely to progress up the career ladder than men. Women in the economics field are less 
likely to get tenure (Ginther and Kahn 2004, Ginther and Kahn 2015) when compared to their male 
colleagues. Many studies have investigated the reasons for women’s underrepresentation in the 
economic profession. Research productivity is cited to be one of the major reasons for the gender 
difference in the economic academia (Conley, Önder and Torgler 2016, Conley and Önder 2014). 
Among all the related factors, increasing importance of co-authorship in economic publications 
has been noted (Hamermesh 2012). Studies have shown that collaborations among economists are 
positively related to the overall productivity of both men and women (Cainelli et al 2015). 
However, women have fewer coauthors in economics partly because they tend to coauthor with 
other women (McDowell, Singell and Stater 2006). More recent studies have addressed the gender 
difference in coauthorship networks and its impact on researcher’s productivity (Ductor 2015, 
Hsieh et al 2018), although identifying the causal effects of professional networks is difficult 
because networks are inherently endogenous. In this study, we investigate the impact of the 
CEMENT mentoring randomized controlled trial on coauthorship networks. Our results show that 
the CEMENT workshop expanded coauthorship networks among treated women. 
The American Economic Association (AEA) Committee on the Status of Women in the 
Economics Profession (CSWEP) has monitored the representation of female economists since the 





CSWEP established the CEMENT mentoring program to support junior female economists.7 The 
National Workshop (now the Workshop for Faculty in Doctoral Programs) focuses on junior 
female economists employed at institutions where research accomplishments weigh heavily in the 
promotion decision. It was originally designed as a randomized controlled trial, and was held every 
other year from 2004-2014. Based on an interim evaluation (Blau et al 2010), the AEA funded the 
workshop every year starting in 2015. Interim results have shown that the CEMENT program 
increased the number of publications, publications in top journals, and the number of federal grants 
for treated cohorts (Blau et al 2010). An updated evaluation also shows that the CEMENT 
workshop increases publications (Currie, Ginther, Blau and Croson 2018). However, neither 
evaluation has investigated the mechanism contributing to the improvement in publication 
outcomes. 
In this paper, we use the CEMENT workshop as an exogenous source of variation in the 
coauthorship networks of treated women. We measure the magnitude of research networks by the 
total number of co-authors of journal publications gathered from publications on Web of Science. 
Then we investigate whether the growth of the networks is achieved in the treated group to the 
control group by comparing the number of authors over time, and we find that the mentoring 
treatment increases publications, but once we control for the number of coauthors, the treatment 
effect is no longer significant. We further examine the treatment effect on the magnitude of 
                                                 
7 CSWEP runs two mentoring workshops. The CEMENT Workshop for Faculty in Doctoral Programs 
(https://www.aeaweb.org/about-aea/committees/cswep/programs/CEMENT-mentoring-workshops#doctoral) was 
originally a randomized controlled trial and is the source of data for this paper. The workshop is held immediately 
following the ASSA meetings. The CEMENT Workshop for Non-Doctoral programs 
(https://www.aeaweb.org/about-aea/committees/cswep/programs/CEMENT-mentoring-workshops#nondoctoral) is 
held in conjunction with a regional economic association meeting (in 2020 with the Western Economic Association 
Meetings). The Non-Doctoral workshop was not designed as a randomized controe Illed trial and does not 





networks and our estimates show that CEMENT treatment did increase the number of unique 
coauthors by almost two. This suggests that the mentoring conference expanded the networks of 
treated women and resulted in a higher number of publications. 
II. The Importance of Collaboration in Research Productivity 
The underrepresentation of women in academic careers has long been studied, and women 
are especially underrepresented in math-intensive science fields in academia (Long 2001, National 
Academies 2005). There is a large body of literature of women’s disadvantage in science since the 
1990s and the gender gap has narrowed in many science, technology, engineering, and 
mathematics (STEM) fields (Ceci et al 2014, Ginther, Kahn and McCloskey 2016, Kahn and 
Ginther 2018). However, women’s representation among PhD students and faculty has stagnated 
since the turn of the century. Ginther and Kahn (2004, 2014) show that women are significantly 
less likely to be promoted to tenure than men. Ginther and Kahn (2014) evaluated the gender 
differences in various career stages in the social sciences, and found that gender differences in the 
likelihood of receiving tenure could not be explained by observable characteristics as in other 
social science fields, and the gap was ever larger for single and childless women. 
Various factors have been examined as explanations for the underrepresentation of women 
in academic careers in math-intensive STEM fields (Ceci et al 2014, Kahn and Ginther 2018). 
Women’s lower research productivity is always cited as one primary reason in explaining women’s 
disadvantage in academic careers. Conley, Önder and Torgler(2016) found that the research 
productivity is positively related with the availability of academic jobs for both genders. Women’s 
responsibility in childbearing and caregiving negatively affect their research productivity (Joecks, 
Pull and Backes-Gellner 2014, Krapf et al 2014). At work, women devote more time in teaching 





2010, Manchester and Barbezat 2013). Lacking research resources – grants and knowledge sharing 
– is another reason (Duch et al 2012). Moreover, Taylor, Fender and Burke (2006) addressed the 
importance of coauthorship, conference presentations and peer effects to the gender difference in 
research productivity, showing the importance of collaboration and research networks to women’s 
research productivity. 
Coauthorship is increasingly important for research productivity in economics Hamermesh 
(2012). Several researchers have examined coauthorship and its impact on academic research 
productivity (Laband and Tollison 2000). Ductor (2015) shows that for journals listed in EconLit, 
the proportion of more-than-one-authored papers increased from 24.7% in 1970s to 62.7% in 2011. 
Hamermesh (2013) examines the changes in the top economics journals in six decades and 
addressed the growing importance of coauthorship in economic paper published as well. Cainelli 
et al (2012, 2015) studied a group of Italian economists and their research outcomes, and found 
that one’s research productivity was correlated with the “propensity to collaborate, his/her 
‘international’ connections and the stability of his/her collaborative behavior.” Although many 
researchers have shown a positive association between coauthorship and research productivity, 
establishing the causal effect of coauthorship is difficult due to the endogeneity of collaboration 
networks. Lee and Bozeman (2005) instrumented coauthorship using a scale for the location of co-
authors. Common research interest between coauthors has also been used as instrument to handle 
the endogeneity of coauthorship networks (Ductor 2015). 
A limited number of papers have studied women’s collaboration networks. McDowell, 
Singell and Stater (2006) showed that female economists were less likely to coauthor than their 
male colleagues, indicating that lacking professional research networks might explain women’s 





disparities rooted from early-life attitude and choices of towards math-intensive subject led to 
women’s underrepresentation later in the academia, which contributed to rather smaller 
professional networks for women to collaborate with each other that ultimately resulting in lower 
female publication rate.. Lacking role models in the research area for women scholars could also 
lead to lower research productivities and hence promotions (Blau et al 2010). However, women’s 
smaller coauthorship networks may be a rational choice because Sarsons (2017) found that women 
were given less credit for coauthored work than men. In addition, Hengel (2017) found that women 
economists may be held to a higher standard for publications than men. 
Although women publish fewer research papers, the average number of citations to those 
papers is the same as men’s (Ceci et al 2014, Ginther and Kahn 2004). De Leon and McQuillan 
(2019) found that the cancellation of the 2012 American Political Science Association Annual 
meeting reduced the number of citations to papers that were scheduled to be presented. The citation 
effects were larger for less prominent authors. Card et al (2018) found that female authored papers 
in economics receive 25% more citations than observably similar male-authored publications. 
Similar to Hengel (2017), they argue that women’s publications are held to higher standard than 
male-authored papers by referees. 
Given the importance of collaboration to research productivity, we hypothesize that the 
CEMENT workshop provides a positive shock to collaboration networks. Since the CEMENT 
workshop is a randomized controlled trial, it may result in an exogenous change to professional 
networks for those who are treated, giving us an opportunity to examine the coauthorship networks 
of CEMENT participants compared to the control group. We discuss the CEMENT mentoring trial 






III. The CEMENT Randomized Controlled Trial 
The CEMENT Mentoring Workshop for Faculty in Doctoral Programs was designed to 
provide role models (senior female economists) and peers in one’s research field. The workshop 
is held immediately after the ASSA meetings and lasts two days. It is designed to provide tacit 
knowledge on managing one’s academic career. Between 40-50 junior faculty attend and are 
divided into groups of 4-5 women in the same field. Two senior female economists in the same 
field are assigned to each group. 
Prior to the conference, each woman circulates a research paper that will be read and 
discussed by the group. During small group sessions, each paper is given an hour where all group 
members provide comments and feedback on the work. In between group sessions, plenary 
sessions made up of a panel of senior mentors are held. These panel discussions focused on the 
topics of research and publishing, getting grants, networking strategies, teaching, the tenure 
process, and work-life balance. Thus, the CEMENT intervention focused on strategies for 
publishing research as well as providing comments on a specific paper. In addition, the networking 
strategy session focused on how to increase professional exposure which would also be associated 
with increasing one’s network. 
Approximately 80 people applied to each workshop. Applications were screened by 
completeness and research intensity of an applicant’s current institution (those at teaching-focused 
universities were re-directed to the Non-Doctoral Workshop). Applicants were assigned to 
groups based on research field (e.g. Labor, Macroeconomics, Health, Development, etc.). Within 
each field, applicants were randomly assigned to treatment or control groups, and more applicants 
were treated than not (e.g. if there were eight applicants in a field, five were selected as treatments). 





and several women applied for multiple workshops. Several women applied for multiple 
workshops in the eight cohorts, and we use information from the last application to determine 
whether the woman was “ever treated.” If a woman was part of a control group in an earlier cohort 
and then became treated, she was dropped from the control group. 
IV. Data on Publications and Careers 
We collected the Curriculum Vitae (CVs) and Web of Science publications of applicants 
to the CEMENT workshop. Our Web of Science queries for publications were based on five years 
prior to the doctorate through the third quarter of 2018. We collected data on the first eight 
CEMENT cohorts from 2004—2016. We did not include the most-recent cohorts because it will 
take time for potential new collaborations to result in additional publications. In total, there are 
592 people in the data. Table 1 lists the cohort year and number of treatment and control groups. 
For all eight cohorts of female economists, we have their basic information – last name, first name, 
institutions and email address and their cohort. We used this information to track them on the 
Internet to find their most recent CVs. We searched for the person by their full name and screened 
the searching results by the institution and field. We were looking for the most recent CVs (updated 
CVs in 2017) for each person. For most people who is working in the academy in 2017, we can 
find either their most recent CVs. From the CVs, we are collecting demographic information, 
education history, employment history, publications and grants (if listed in the CVs). For people 
whose CVs are not found through online search, we then turn to other sources of information, such 
as LinkedIn, academic webpages, or personal webpages. If still we cannot find the person, then 
we searched for any additional information that could possibly identify the person we are looking 
for, such as institution/company webpage, ResearchGate, Google Scholar, etc. After we 





possibly find in the Access Database file, which is designed specifically for the CEMENT data. In 
this part of data collection, we mainly focused on the demographic information, education history 
and employment history, because such information is easier to be confirmed through the above 
online sources. We ranked the quality of the PhD granting departments and of the person’s current 
employer using rankings based on Kalaitzidakis, Mamuneas, and Stegnos (2003) because it 
includes international universities.8 
Once we had information on affiliations, we collected publication data from Clarivate 
Analytics Web of Science (https://clarivate.com/products/web-of-science/). Web of Science 
(WOS) is an online subscription-based scientific citation indexing service, giving access to 
multiple databases, which include most highly-cited economics journals. Although publication 
data is collected on CVs, we were unable to find recent CVs for several participants. In addition, 
hand-entry of publications from CVs resulted in significant coding errors. Publications from other 
sources (such as Google Scholar) contain many working papers and papers that are not published 
in refereed journals. In contrast, WOS provides consistent measures of publications. However, 
WOS authors are not-disambiguated thus searchers for people with common names may have false 
positive publication records. In addition, the number of economics journals indexed in WOS has 
changed over time.9 The appendix provides information on how we queried WOS and validated 
publications. 
                                                 
8 The top 10 departments were Harvard University, University of Chicago, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
Northwestern University, University of Pennsylvania, Yale University, Princeton University, Stanford University, University of 
California- Berkeley and New York University. 
9 According to the Journal Citation Reports the number of Economics journals indexed in WOS increased from 166 
in 2002 to 191 in 2007, 333 in 2012 and 353 in 2017 (the latest year available). Some of this was from the creation 





Our WOS publication data contain information on year of publication, journal, affiliations, 
coauthor names, and citations. We ranked journals based on quality. Top tier journals are the 
American Economic Review, the Journal of Political Economy, the Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, and Econometrica. Rank 2 journals are considered top field journals, and Rank 3 
publications are all journals indexed in WOS that are not categorized as Rank 1 or Rank 2. Table 
2 lists the titles of Rank 1 and Rank 2 Journals and the number of publications by those in the 
treatment and control groups in our sample. 
V. Results 
We begin our analysis with graphical depictions of the data. Figure 1 shows the average 
publications by year since PhD in our sample. As expected very few economists publish before 
completing their doctorate and then the number of publications grows to over .8 publications per 
year between 5 and 9 years since doctorate. Productivity peaks at 7 years past PhD (coinciding 
with the typical tenure clock) and then trends downward. Figure 2 shows that female economists 
in our sample are increasingly likely to coauthor. The average number of authors on publications 
was two in the early years of our sample but increased to almost three by the end. 
In order to test the validity of our experiment, Table 3 tests for significant differences in 
observable characteristics for the treatment and control group. Our t-tests of mean differences 
indicate no significant differences in observable characteristics between the treatment and control 
groups. 
Figure 3 repeats the analysis of Figure 1 but in this case, by treatment status. The treatment 
and control groups track each other in terms of publications per year through five years past PhD 
and then the treatment group has a higher number of publications per year than the control group. 





average publications during the year of the treatment, and then the two averages coincide until 
year seven, when the treatment group has higher average publications. 
Since Figures 1 and 3 show that average publications differ by years since PhD, and our 
sample includes people who received their doctorates between 1995 and 2015, it is important to 
control for career stage and when individuals in the sample received the treatment. We begin by 
replicating analysis from Currie, Ginther, Blau and Croson (2018) on the effect of the CEMENT 
treatment on the total number of publications indexed in WOS in Table 4. Model 1 includes an 
indicator for treatment only, the coefficient is positive, but marginally significant (p<.11). When 
we include controls for years since PhD and treatment cohort, the results indicate that treated 
women have 1.1 additional publications compared to the controls. Model 3 adds controls for 
ranking of the doctorate program and first job. Treated women have one more publication than the 
controls (p<.06). 
Table 5 repeats this analysis, but instead uses the count of number of unique coauthors. 
Models 1 through 3 show that each additional coauthor leads to over .5 publications. Models 4 
through 6 add controls for both coauthors and treatment. The treatment effect falls in magnitude 
and is no longer statistically significant. However, the coauthor coefficient is of the same 
magnitude and remains statistically significant. 
Given that the number of coauthors eliminates the estimated treatment effect, we examine 
whether treatment is associated with more coauthors in Table 6. Models 1 and 2 in Table 6 indicate 
that treated women have between 1.5 and 1.7 more coauthors than those in the control group. 
Model 3 adds controls for the rank of the doctorate program and the rank of the first job. Women 





6 more coauthors. Despite these significant effects, the treated women still have 1.5 more 
coauthors than those in the control group. 
Finally, we examine the number of high-quality publications those in the top journals (QJE, 
JPE, AER and Econometrica) and top field journals listed in Table 2. Model 2 in Table 7 indicates 
that women in the treatment group have .5 more high quality publications than the control group. 
However, Model 3 indicates that these publications are explained by the rank of the doctorate and 
first job. Models 7 through 9 control for both treatment and the number of coauthors. The treatment 
effect is no longer significant. However, each additional coauthor is associated with about .1 more 
high quality publications. 
VI. Conclusion 
Women continue to be underrepresented in the economics profession. In particular, 
researchers have found that women publish fewer papers than men (Ginther and Kahn 2004), have 
more difficulty publishing their work (Hengel 2017 and Card et al 2018), and are given less credit 
for coauthored work (Sarsons 2017). The CEMENT randomized controlled mentoring trial has 
shown that mentoring increases the number and quality of publications (Blau, Currie, Croson and 
Ginther 2010, Currie, Ginther, Blau and Croson 2018). This paper examines whether the increase 
in publications is the result of expanded coauthoring networks. 
We found that the mentoring treatment increases publications, but once we control for the 
number of coauthors, the treatment effect is no longer significant. Estimates show that CEMENT 
treatment did increase the number of unique coauthors by almost two. This suggests that the 






Although these preliminary results suggest that the CEMENT workshop expanded treated 
women’s professional networks, more work remains. We are in the process of identifying the 
number of direct collaborations that resulted from the mentoring workshop. In addition, we plan 
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TABLES FOR ESSAY 2 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Cohorts 
Cohort Cohort 
Year 
Number of Observation 
Treated Control Total 
1 2004 45 34 79 
2 2006 38 28 66 
3 2008 45 26 71 
4 2010 34 21 55 
5 2012 40 52 92 
6 2014 41 45 86 
7 2015 40 38 78 

























Table 2: List and the Number of Rank 1 and Rank 2 Journal Publications 
Rank 1 Journals Number of Publications 
Treated Control Total 
American Economic Review 60 33 93 
Econometrica 10 2 12 
Journal of Political Economy 13 10 23 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 40 14 54 
 Rank 1 Total 182 
Rank 2 Journals    
American Economic Journal: Applied 
economics 
42 31 73 
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 32 36 68 
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 11 6 17 
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 2 7 9 
American Economic Review Papers & 
Proceedings 
116 84 200 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 11 11 22 
Economic Journal 23 9 32 
Economics Letters 52 46 98 
Economic Theory 8 4 12 
Econometric Theory 8 0 8 
European Economic Review 22 24 46 
Games and Economic Behavior 22 20 42 
International Economic Review 19 10 29 
Journal of Applied Econometrics 17 7 24 
Journal of Business & Economic Statistics 16 3 19 
Journal of Development Economics 43 27 70 
Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 8 13 21 
Journal of Economic History 16 17 33 
Journal of Economic Literature 11 9 20 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 13 7 20 
Journal of Economic Theory 9 5 14 
Journal of Econometrics 39 13 52 
Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management 
11 16 27 
Journal of Financial Economics 10 11 21 
Journal of Health Economics 63 50 113 
Journal of Human Resources 55 39 94 





Journal of Labor Economics 25 16 41 
Journal of Monetary Economics 12 13 25 
Journal of Public Economics 69 59 128 
JAMA-Journal of the American Medical 
Association 
4 0 4 
New England Journal of Medicine 28 2 30 
Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 6 0 6 
Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Science of the United States of America 
10 9 19 
RAND Journal of Economics 7 3 10 
Review of Economics and Statistics 56 36 92 
Review of Economic Studies 22 7 29 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics 4 3 7 
Science 8 7 15 

































Table 3:  Test of Balance for Covariates 
 Treat Control T-test p-value 
Foreign PhD 0.071 0.109 1.446 0.149 
Top 10 PhD 0.320 0.288 -0.745 0.457 
Top 11-20 PhD 0.255 0.228 -0.663 0.508 
Top 21-40 PhD 0.189 0.207 0.465 0.642 
Top 41-100 PhD 0.134 0.141 0.244 0.807 
Top 101+ PhD 0.102 0.136 1.133 0.258 
First Job Top 10 0.112 0.114 0.080 0.937 
First Job Top 11-20 0.090 0.060 -1.214 0.225 
First Job Top 21-40 0.087 0.060 -1.102 0.271 
First Job Top 41-100 0.158 0.147 -0.348 0.728 
First Job 100+ 0.457 0.484 0.588 0.556 
Academic First Job 0.888 0.842 -1.482 0.139 






























Table 4:  Effect of CEMENT Treatment on Publications 
  (1) (2) (3) 













Top 10 PhD   -0.645 
   (0.726) 
Top 11-20 PhD   -0.157 
   (0.737) 
Top 21-40 PhD   0.999 
   (0.779) 
First Job Top 10   2.931*** 
   (0.859) 
First Job Top 11-20   2.331** 
   (0.979) 
First Job Top 21-40   0.967 
   (0.995) 
Cohort 















Standard errors in parentheses   




















Table 5:  Effect of Coauthors on Number of Publications 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Publications Publications Publications Publications Publications Publications 
              
Unique Coauthors 0.549*** 0.497*** 0.499*** 0.548*** 0.496*** 0.498*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) 
treatment    0.147 0.249 0.263 
    (0.356) (0.345) (0.346) 
Top 10 PhD   -0.229   -0.237 
   (0.462)   (0.463) 
Top 11-20 PhD   -0.085   -0.098 
   (0.469)   (0.469) 
Top 21-40 PhD   0.262   0.259 
   (0.497)   (0.497) 
First Job Top 10   0.530   0.530 
   (0.555)   (0.555) 
First Job Top 11-20   -0.790   -0.808 
   (0.635)   (0.635) 
First Job Top 21-40   0.686   0.668 
   (0.633)   (0.634) 
       
       
Cohort No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Years Since PhD No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
       
Observations 506 506 506 506 506 506 
R-squared 0.651 0.704 0.707 0.651 0.704 0.707 
Standard errors in parentheses 




















Table 6:  Effect of Treatment on Number of Coauthors 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 
total number of 
unique coauthor of 
wos journal 
total number of 
unique coauthor of 
wos journal 
total number of 
unique coauthor of 
wos journal 
        
treatment 1.387 1.582* 1.408* 
 (0.881) (0.858) (0.840) 
Top 10 PhD   -0.821 
   (1.125) 
Top 11-20 PhD   -0.117 
   (1.142) 
Top 21-40 PhD   1.487 
   (1.208) 
First Job Top 10   4.825*** 
   (1.332) 
First Job Top 11-20   6.310*** 
   (1.518) 
First Job Top 21-40   0.601 
   (1.542) 
Cohort No Yes Yes 
Years Since PhD No Yes Yes 
    
Observations 506 506 506 
R-squared 0.005 0.148 0.197 
Standard errors in parentheses 







































































FIGURES FOR ESSAY 2 
 
Figure 1:  Average Publications by Year Since PhD 
 
 









Figure 3:  Average Publications by Year Since PhD and Treatment 
 
 






APPENDIX FOR ESSAY 2 
 
 
Appendix: Web of Science Search Process 
We started by creating a list of search queries for everyone in the CEMENT data. Each 
search query includes names, publication year intervals and affiliations. For names, we use both 
full names and name initials, because publications indexed in WOS prior to 2008 included only 
last names and initials for first and middle name. We limit the publication year intervals to be from 
5 years prior to PhD year to 2018. The affiliations are the job institutions or affiliations of each 
person. Such information could be found on the job information collected in in the CVs. Institution 
names must be changed according to the Web of Science organization enhanced index. 
For example, we have a female in the data named Katherine R. McDonald, who 
graduated in the 2008 from University of Kansas, and she worked in the University of Chicago 
from 2009 to 2013 and switched to Federal Reserve Bank of Boston after 2013. Then the search 
query for her would be: 
      (AU = “McDonald, Katherine” or AU = McDonald, KR or AU = “McDonald, K”) and 
      (PY = (2003-2018)) and (OG = “University of Kansas” or OG = “University of Chicago” or 
      OG = “Federal Reserve Bank – Boston”) 
The search with the name “McDonald, KR” would results in all the records with the full 
name “McDonald, Katherine R.” For people without a middle name (or middle name is not found), 
the search using last name and first name initials would result in records with same last name but 
not same first name. For example, paper published by McDonald, Kathy or McDonald, Kevin are 
likely to be found. Economics papers published before 2006 and Health economics paper 





After searching and downloading the result files from WOS for each person, we put the 
data together and hand-validated publications using information from the CVs. We use author’s 
full names, field, institutions and journals to find the false records. 
There are several potential limitations to our data. First, the data collection is based on 
online searches. We are not able to find all the information for everyone in the data, making it less 
consistent in data colleting. Second, because of the query limitations in WOS, we cannot simply 
use the WOS search results only. The search queries vary by each person. Some searches returned 
out with zero record which required updating. The screening process may have introduced coding 
errors. Most of the CV searches were done in 2017, however publications were found in WOS 



















THE IMPACT OF OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING AND NON-U.S. CITIZEN: AN 
ANALYSIS USING CPS JOB CERTIFICATE DATA 
I. Introduction 
Occupational regulations are widely adopted by states that approve minimum standards or 
credentials for work in order to practice in certain occupations. The regulations range from less 
restrictive (required to register with government agencies), having an exclusive right to a title 
(known as certifications or certificates)10, to very restrictive (known as licensure, where it is illegal 
to practice without a license) 11  (Gittleman, Klen and Kleiner, 2015). In the United States, 
occupational licensing is a fast-growing form of occupational regulation. Back in the early 1950s, 
only 5 percent of the labor force was covered by licensing laws. Through the 2000s, the percentage 
increased to 20% and today, the coverage is closed to 30% of the U.S labor force (Blair and Chung, 
2018).  
Occupational licensing, or job certifications, require individual workers to pass certain 
credentials to practice in certain occupations. Such credentials include requirements on education, 
special trainings, and/or to pass certification tests. Theoretically, such occupational regulations 
would restrict the labor supply and hence drive up the wage payments. These regulations are aimed 
at protecting the licensed practitioner as well as maintaining the quality of labor and service in the 
occupations. Thus, occupational licensing sets barriers to the initial entry, and thereby reduces the 
                                                 
10 A certification or certificate is always a state-grant title (occupational “right-to-title”) which protect persons 
meeting predetermined standards. People without a certification may also be able to perform in the occupation 
but cannot use the title.  
11 Licensing refers to the “right-to-practice” which is protected by the law. It is illegal to practice in the occupation 





labor supply but increases the wage in certain occupations. Empirical studies have examined the 
economic effects in various aspects of occupational licensing.  
Early studies have looked into the labor market influences of occupational regulations 
(Friedman and Kuznets, 1945). More recently, with the rapid growing of licensure coverage, the 
primary focus of research studies is to examine the wage premium. Kleiner (2000) looked into the 
wage differences in selected licensed and non-licensed occupations, and concluded a wage 
advantage for the licensed occupations. More recently, an approximately 15% wage premium is 
found to be associated with occupational licensing (Kleiner and Krueger, 2009). Later, Kleiner 
and Krueger (2013) found a slightly higher occupational licensing wage premium of 18%. 
Similarly, Gittleman et al (2015) re-confirmed a licensing wage premium, and found that licensed 
workers were more likely to receive retirement or pension plan offers, which is a contradictory to 
the primary findings of Gittleman and Kleiner one year later (Gittleman and Kleiner, 2016)12.  
However, labor market outcomes are not restricted to earnings. Employment is equally 
important. Law and Marks (2009) conducted a quasi-experimental research design to estimate the 
labor supply effects of licensing for the minorities and found that licensing laws did not harm the 
female and black workers but helped in occupations where worker’s quality was hard to measure.13 
On the contrary, Blair and Chung (2018) found that occupational licensing reduced equilibrium 
labor supply using a boundary discontinuity design and found that licensing reduced relative labor 
supply of white men by 15.2% and black men by 18.9%, but no significant effect for women. From 
the perspective of certain occupations, a wage premium of 16.2% was found for licensed massage 
                                                 
12 Gittleman and Kleiner (2016) found no evidence to support the better access to retirement or pension plan 
offers for licensed worker.  
13 They found that the introduction of licensing laws increased the representation of blacks among teachers, 
physicians and practical nurses, and of women among engineers and pharmacists. But reductions in the 





therapists, together with a reduced labor supply (Thornton and Timmons, 2013). Kleiner and Park 
(2010) explored the occupational licensing in dentists and dental hygienists, and found a 10% wage 
premium and 6% increase in employment growth for licensed hygienists in states allowing 
independent work. However, opposite effects were found for licensed dentists. Later, Kleiner et al 
(2016) found a 5% wage premium for licensed nurses but no significant employment effects. 
Another economic effect of occupational licensing is the reduction of mobility of human capital 
(Kleiner and Wheelan, 2010; Peterson, Pandya and Leblang, 2014; Mulholland and Young, 2016), 
which has been well established.  
In addition to the studies stated above, few studies have examined the effects of 
occupational licensing on immigrants. Although some have studied the effects on the minorities 
(Law and Marks, 2009; Blair and Chung, 2018), most are focused on female and underrepresented 
minorities. Federman et al (2006) studied the entry of Vietnamese into manicuring occupation 
(which normally requires a licensure) across countries, and found that with the increase in the 
required amount of training, a reduction of the number of Vietnamese manicurists were found as 
well as the number of new entries (Federman, Harrington and Krynski, 2006). Two other studies 
examined the occupational licensing on immigrants in Canada. Banerjee and Phan (2014) showed 
that occupational licensing requirements in the destination country largely affected the entry into 
regulated professions. Gomez et al (2015) investigated the effect of occupational licensing on 
immigrant labor market outcomes in Canada. They estimated the earning premium for immigrants 
and non-immigrants in regulated occupations and found that immigrants – compare to non-
immigrants – were earning more but were less likely to work in regulated occupations. Similarly, 





a large selective immigration program and reconfirmed a licensing wage premium as well as a 
reduction of over-education and occupational downgrade of people working in licensed jobs.14  
As a national and state policy issue, the lack of a comprehensive database of occupational 
licensing or job certifications is one major difficulty in examining this topic. In this study, I 
continue with the question of the economic effects of occupational licensing, and focus on the 
population of non-U.S. citizens, using the most recent CPS data on job certifications and licenses 
at an individual level. I re-examine the effects of occupational licensing on earnings and hours 
worked per week, and also investigated the effects for non-U.S citizens. My results re-confirm a 
wage penalty of being a non-U.S. citizen and a wage premium of having a job certificate(and 
license)15. Non-U.S. citizens are found to be less likely to have job certificates (and licenses). 
Furthermore, I look at a sample of licensed people only, and non-U.S. citizens still suffer from a 
wage disadvantage. However, the effects on earnings vary across occupational groups.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, I describe the data and the 
models used in the study. In Section III, I present and interpret the main regression results. In the 
last section, I conclude with a discussion.   
II. Data and Model 
A. Job Certificate Data 
In January 2015, three questions on job certifications and licenses, based on the work of 
the Interagency Working Group on Expanded Measures of Enrollment and Attainment 
                                                 
14 Another finding of this paper is a substantial skill wastage happened after settlement. Not every immigrant 
continues working in a licensed occupation after settlement. An under-use of migrants’ human capital was noticed 
as a result of a tighter connection between employment and immigration policy.  
15 In CPS data, questions are asked whether have a professional certification or state or industry license. In this 





(GEMEnA), were introduced to the CPS. The questions are asked of all household members who 
are age 15 and older. The three questions are:  
1. Do you have a currently active professional certification or a state or industry license?  
If answer “Yes” for question (1), then the two following questions are asked: 
2. Were/Are any of your certifications or licenses issued by the federal, state, or local 
government? 
3. Was/Is your certification or license required for any of your jobs (job/main job/job from 
which you are on layoff/job at which you last worked)? 
A primary advantage of the CPS Job Certification and Licensing data is that it is a 
microdata asked of individuals. Most of the occupational licensing data used previously are based 
on occupations where licenses vary by states. Such data are focused on whether occupational 
licensing or certification is required for certain occupations in each state. Since people’s 
occupations are not used to identify whether they have a certification or license, the CPS provides 
better data to measure the impact of occupational licensing. This is because occupational 
regulations may vary across states and occupations. Thus, it is not sufficient to measure the 
presence of a certification or license based on occupation or job title. The CPS provides an 
opportunity to investigate the effect of occupational licensing on individual outcomes.  
However, some disadvantages of the data need to be stated here. First, certifications and 
licenses are defined together as “credentials that demonstrate a level of skill or knowledge need to 
perform a specific type of job”.16 There is no way to distinguish between a job certificate and an 
occupational license. Second, in question (3), “required” means either legally required or required 
                                                 





by employer. It is not clear on the jobs that asked for required certifications or license. This variable 
could be misleading. Thus, in the analysis, I use occupation to supplement the first two job 
certificates (or license) variables, and the third question is not used as a determinate of whether a 
certificate (or license) is required for the job.  
B. Sample Selection 
Data used in this paper is gathered from IPUMS-CPS.17 Although CPS job certification 
and licensing data was introduced in January 2015, variables for all three questions were not 
available on IPUMS-CPS until October 2017. 18  Thus, I select monthly personal data using 
IPUMS-CPS from October 2017 to January 2019.19 The sample was limited to individual age 16 
to 65 who are currently employed  and not in the armed forces. Table 1-1 shows summary statistics 
of the full data set. Nearly 23 percent of the total sample reported to have active job certificate and 
license. Compared to 24 percentage number of licensed U.S. citizens, only 10 percent of non-U.S. 
citizens have job certificate and license. Then I restricted the data to the sampled people with active 
job certificates only, and Table 1-2 shows the summary statistics. The majority of the licensed 
workers are U.S. citizens, and only 3.4% are non-U.S. citizens. Consistent with the full sample, 
female and married people are more likely to have job certificates. The weighted average mean 
values on the bottom panel shows that licensed U.S. citizens are earning a bit more than licensed 
non-U.S. citizen, however, the mean values are not significant different.  
                                                 
17 Sarah Flood, Miriam King, Renae Rodgers, Steven Ruggles, and J. Robert Warren. Integrated Public Use 
Microdata Series, Current Population Survey: Version 6.0 [dataset]. Minneapolis, MN: IPUMS, 2018. 
https://doi.org/10.18128/D030.V6.0. 
18 Data in the year of 2015 and 2016 could be extract from the US Census Bureau’s DataWeb FTP page. Due to 
programming error, the third question was not asked in May and June 2015 of household in their first and fifth 
interviews.  
19 Data used in this study was retrieved from IPUMS-CPS in March 2019, when job certifications and licensing data 






I start with an analysis by examining the labor market effects of non-U.S citizens and job 
certification (and license). The dependent variables are log of hourly wage, log of weekly earnings 
and hours worked per week. Both hourly wage and weekly earnings are CPI adjusted. The model 
is as below:  
           Y = α + β1 non-U.S citizen + β2 Job Certificate and License + γX + µ                                                                                                             
In the model, non-U.S citizen equals to 1 if the person is not a U.S. citizen. For job 
certificate and license indicators, I use two variables according to question (1) and question (2). 
Question (1) (variable 1) provide an indicator of whether people have an active job certificate or 
license. Question (2) (variable 2) is an indicator whether people have an active government-issued 
job certificate or license.20 X is a set of control variables that influence the labor market outcomes, 
including gender, age, marital status, year of immigration, educational attainment, working status 
(full time or part time) and union coverage. In addition, I control for time variables (year and 
month). All standard errors are robust. The specific weight is used for analysis with CPS earning 
variables.21  
To further examine the foreign citizen with certificate, I restrict the sample to people 
working with active certificate and license only, and then estimate the wage and labor supply effect 
on non-U.S. citizen. Regression results are presented in the following section.   
 
 
                                                 
20 Question 2 (variable 2) fit the definition of occupational license. It can be treated as a license variable, different 
from job certification.  
21 In CPS, an earning weight is a personal level weight used in any analysis including hourly wage, weekly earnings 






Table 2 and Table 3 present the estimation results of the effects of non-U.S citizen and the 
two  job certificate (and license) variables on labor market outcomes. Consistent with previous 
findings, a wage penalty is found for non-U.S citizens: compared to U.S citizens, non-U.S. citizens 
earn 8.6 percent less in hourly wage and 7.7 percent less in weekly earnings. No significant effects 
of occupational licensing were found on labor supply. The results also confirm the occupational 
licensing wage premium. Having an active job certificate (and license) increases the hourly wage 
by 6.8 percent and weekly earnings by 8.6 percent (Table 1). Having a government-issued job 
certificate (and license) has a slightly smaller wage premium: 5.5 percent increase in hourly wage 
and 7.2 percent increase in weekly earnings (Table 2). Both job certificate (and license) variables 
significantly increase the hours worked per week by approximate 1 hour on average.  
Then I restrict the sample to people with active job certificate (and license) only22 and 
estimate the effects of wage and labor supply on non-U.S. citizens. Table 4 presents supportive 
evidence for foreign citizen wage penalty. For people with active job certificates (and licenses), 
non-U.S. citizens earns 9.9 percent less in hourly wage and 11.9 percent less in weekly earning 
than licensed U.S. citizens. Also, non-U.S. citizens are working 0.68 hours less per week (at 5% 
significant level).Thus, the non-U.S. citizen wage penalty remains in the sample of individuals 
holding a job certificate or license. 
In addition to the above analysis, I estimate a probit model to see whether non-U.S. citizens 
are less likely to obtain job certificates (and licenses) in the United States. Results are presented in 
                                                 
22 Sample that having a government-issued job certificates (and licenses) is a subset of the sample having active job 
certificates (and licenses). In order to have a bigger sample size of licensed people, I limit the sample by having 





Table 5. All significant and negative coefficients tell that non-U.S. citizens are less likely to obtain 
job certificates (and licenses). I later run a marginal effect on each citizen variable, and result 
shows that, keeping everything else constant, getting job certificates is more likely to be judged as 
low in the non-U.S. citizen groups than in the U.S. citizen population.  
Since regulations are different across occupations, I take a closer look at the earnings 
effects of the job certificates (and license) in 10 major occupation groups23. I re-estimate the 
models of wage premium on two earnings variables over full sample and limited sample across 10 
occupation groups. Table 6 shows the estimate results on hourly wage, and Table 7 presents the 
results on weekly earnings. Both Table 6 and Table 7 have three panels. Panel 1 shows the effects 
of non-U.S. citizens and having active job certificates using full sample. Panel 2 shows the effects 
of non-U.S. citizens and having government-issued job certificates using full sample. Panel 3 
shows the effects of non-U.S. citizens using limited sample of having active job certificates only. 
From both tables, with full sample, non-U.S. citizens’ wage penalty is significant in most 
occupation groups except for high-skill industries – Business and Finance, Management and 
Professional – as well as Farming Fishing and Forestry. The other occupations are considered low-
skill occupations, in which the wage penalty for non-U.S. citizens is consistent in Panel 1 and 
Panel 2 of both tables. The wage premium of having job certificates (and licenses) is even more 
obvious in the full sample panels (Panel 1 and Panel 2), except for people working in the Farming, 
Fishing and Forestry. However, when limiting the sample to licensed people only, the significant 
wage penalty for being a non-U.S. citizen is missing, except for Service and Production industries 
(Panel 3).   
                                                 






The CPS job certification and licensing data provide a microdata of occupational licensing 
on an individual base. Different from previous studies, now we can observe whether an individual 
have a job certificate (and license) or not. Using the recent CPS data with job certificate and 
license, I re-examine the effect of occupational licensing on wage earnings, and an occupational 
wage premium is re-confirmed. Non-U.S. citizens are suffering from a wage penalty, compare to 
U.S. natives. And non-U.S. citizens are less likely to obtain job certificates and licenses. Even 
among licensed workers, the wage penalty for non-U.S. citizens persist.  
Across different occupations, the foreign citizen wage penalty is found in low-skilled 
occupations, and the licensing wage premium is confirmed in almost all occupations, except for 
Fishing, Farming and Forestry. Since the licensure requirements are different across occupations, 
some occupations, certain occupation groups may have more strict requirement on licensing, 
compare to other occupations in which licenses and certificates are less important that education 
and skills. For high-skilled occupations, such as Financial, Business and Professional related jobs, 
a certificate or license may not be required such that working experience, certain skills and 
educational credential are more important. On the contrary, for low-skilled occupations, such as 
Barbers, Manicurist/Pedicurist and Massage Therapist, a license is always required as a credential 
to enter the market. Moreover, the population groups may vary across occupations. For examples, 
there are more Vietnamese working as Manicurist/Pedicurist compare to Americans. But when 
limiting the sample to people with job certificates only, there are fewer supportive evidences for 
wage penalty for non-U.S. citizens. Well, licensed immigrants in Service industry are still 





Since CPS job certification and licensing data are asked for individual but not available for 
states, further research could merge in state occupational licensing data by occupation information, 
which will be devoted to understanding the effects clustered on states. Furthermore, occupational 
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TABLES FOR ESSAY 3 
Table 1-1: Summary Statistics of Employed Workers age 16 to 65 by Licensing Status and 
Characteristics, CPS monthly data from Oct. 2017 to Jan. 2019 
 
Variables Total 





Job Certificate and 
License 
Total 965,506 0.2290 0.2078 
Gender    
Male 501,357 0.2045 0.1806 
Female 464,149 0.2554 0.2373 
Age Group    
16-24 114,758 0.0915 0.0826 
25-44 436,158 0.2414 0.2184 
45-65 414,590 0.2539 0.2314 
Marital Status    
Married 535,599 0.2638 0.2405 
Not Married 429,907 0.1856 0.1672 
Citizenship    
US Citizen 890,978 0.2397 0.2181 
Non-US Citizen 74,528 0.1001 0.0876 
Work Status    
Usually Full Time 805,731 0.2410 0.2183 
Usually Part Time 159,775 0.1684 0.1552 
Education Level    
Less than HS 75,935 0.0624 0.0564 
HS or GED 252,792 0.1316 0.1186 
Some College 168,121 0.1769 0.1577 
Associate 106,575 0.3115 0.2842 
Bachelor 232,590 0.2643 0.2368 
Master 94,660 0.3994 0.3665 
Professional 14,793 0.7242 0.6927 
Doctorate 20,035 0.5050 0.4783 
Union Status    








Table 1-2: Summary Statistics of Employed Workers age 16 to 65 by Licensing Status and 
Characteristics, CPS monthly data from Oct. 2017 to Jan. 2019: Limited to People with 
Active Job Certificate (or License) only 
 
Variables          Total      U.S. Citizen     Non-U.S. Citizen 
Total 221,067 213,610 7,457 
Gender    
Male 102,515 98,645 3,870 
Female 118,552 114,965 3,587 
Marital Status    
Married 141,291 136,277 5,014 
Not Married 79,776 77,333 2,443 
Work Status    
Usually Full Time 194,165 187,670 6,495 
Usually Part Time 26,902 25,940 962 
Education Level    
Less than HS 4,741 4,054 687 
HS or GED 33,274 31,895 1,379 
Some College 29,748 28,923 825 
Associate 33,197 32,498 669 
Bachelor 61,469 59,641 1,828 
Master 37,807 36,551 1,256 
Professional 10,713 10,336 337 
Doctorate 10,118 9,712 406 
Mean Value    
Hourly Wage 28.045 28.132 26.044 
Weekly Earnings 1171.39 1175.784 1071.477 
Hours Worked per 












Table 2: Effects of non-U.S Citizen and Job Certificate (and License) on Labor Market 
Outcomes, Controlling for Year and Month 
 
VARIABLES Hourly Wage Weekly Earning 
Hours Worked per 
Week 
      
Non-US Citizen -0.086*** -0.077*** -0.098 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.07) 
Have Active Job 
Certificate 0.068*** 0.086*** 1.160*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) 
Demographic     
Female -0.172*** -0.226*** -1.874*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) 
Age 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.036*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.119*** 0.128*** 0.280*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.09) 
Year of Immigration -0.000 -0.000* -0.014*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Education     
High school or GED 0.177*** 0.208*** 0.279 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.41) 
Some college  0.243*** 0.271*** 0.338 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.41) 
Associate degree 0.325*** 0.355*** 0.404 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.41) 
Bachelor's degree 0.623*** 0.656*** 0.729 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.41) 
Master's degree 0.773*** 0.796*** 1.130**  
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.41) 
Professional degree 0.860*** 0.964*** 4.417*** 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.47) 
Doctorate degree 0.881*** 0.950*** 2.897*** 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.44) 
Usually Part Time -0.283*** -0.972*** -19.098*** 
  (0.00) (0.01) (0.06) 
Union membership 0.066*** 0.082*** -0.042 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) 
R-sqr 0.334 0.47 0.507 
Obs 198830 202969 192175 





Table 3: Effects of Non-U.S Citizen and Government-Issued Job Certificate (and License) 
on Labor Market Outcomes, Controlling for Year and Month 
 
VARIABLES Hourly Wage 
Weekly 
Earning 
Hours Worked per 
Week 
      
Non-US Citizen -0.087*** -0.078*** -0.105 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.07) 
Have Active Gov-
Issued Job Certificate 0.055*** 0.072*** 1.075*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) 
Demographic     
Female -0.172*** -0.226*** -1.881*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) 
Age 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.036*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.120*** 0.129*** 0.284*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) 
Year of Immigration -0.000 -0.000* -0.014*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Education     
High school or GED 0.179*** 0.210*** 0.293 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.41) 
Some college  0.245*** 0.274*** 0.364 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.41) 
Associate degree 0.329*** 0.361*** 0.442 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.41) 
Bachelor's degree 0.627*** 0.661*** 0.764 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.41) 
Master's degree 0.779*** 0.803*** 1.176**  
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.41) 
Professional degree 0.870*** 0.976*** 4.469*** 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.47) 
Doctorate degree 0.888*** 0.958*** 2.942*** 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.44) 
Usually Part Time -0.284*** -0.972*** -19.105*** 
  (0.00) (0.01) (0.06) 
Union membership 0.068*** 0.084*** -0.043 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) 
R-sqr 0.333 0.47 0.507 
Obs 198830 202969 192175 





Table 4: Effects of Non-U.S. Citizens on Labor Market Outcomes, controlling for year and 
month, limited sample for people with active job certificates (and license) only 
 
Variables  Hourly Wage Weekly Earning 
Hours Worked per 
Week 
     
Non-U.S. Citizen -0.099*** -0.119*** -0.680**  
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.24) 
Demographic    
Female -0.172*** -0.244*** -2.706*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.09) 
Age 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.014*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.092*** 0.086*** -0.077 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.09) 
Year of Immigration 0.000 0.000 -0.021*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Education    
High school or GED 0.382*** 0.373** -1.015 
  (0.07) (0.12) (2.91) 
Some college but 
n~e 0.431*** 0.414*** -0.747 
  (0.07) (0.12) (2.89) 
Associate degree 0.554*** 0.518*** -1.287 
  (0.07) (0.12) (2.89) 
Bachelor's degree 0.816*** 0.777*** -1.174 
  (0.07) (0.12) (2.89) 
Master's degree 0.924*** 0.888*** -0.436 
  (0.07) (0.12) (2.89) 
Professional degree 1.092*** 1.152*** 3.499 
  (0.07) (0.12) (2.90) 
Doctorate degree 1.075*** 1.102*** 1.91 
  (0.07) (0.12) (2.90) 
Usually Part Time -0.157*** -0.808*** -18.661*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.15) 
Union membership 0.054*** 0.076*** 0.380**  
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.12) 
     
R-sqr 0.234 0.328 0.367 
Obs 47661 49049 46329 






Table 5: Probit of Job Certificate (and License) being a Non-U.S. Citizen 
 
 Variables Have Active Job Certificate 
Have Gov-Issued Job 
Certificate 
Non-U.S. Citizen -0.566*** -0.385*** -0.582*** -0.398*** 
  (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Demographic     
Female  0.185***  0.226*** 
   (0.01)  (0.01) 
Age  0.005***  0.005*** 
   (0.00)  (0.00) 
Married  0.145***  0.146*** 
   (0.01)  (0.01) 
Year of 
Immigration  -0.003***  -0.003*** 
   (0.00)  (0.00) 
Education     
High school or GED  1.008***  0.938*** 
   (0.21)  (0.21) 
Some college   1.223***  1.133*** 
   (0.21)  (0.21) 
Associate degree  1.637***  1.544*** 
   (0.21)  (0.21) 
Bachelor's degree  1.506***  1.409*** 
   (0.21)  (0.21) 
Master's degree  1.868***  1.767*** 
   (0.21)  (0.21) 
Professional 
degree  2.819***  2.718*** 
   (0.21)  (0.21) 
Doctorate degree  2.154***  2.073*** 
   (0.21)  (0.21) 
      
Usually Part Time  -0.157***  -0.142*** 
   (0.0`)  (0.01) 
Union membership  0.450***  0.482*** 
   (0.01)  (0.01) 
     
Obs 886298 203294 886298 203294 
               * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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